External conjectural variations in symmetric oligopoly equilibrium by Ludovic Alexandre JULIEN
External conjectural variations in symmetric oligopoly
equilibrium 
Ludovic Alexandre JULIEN
EconomiX, University of Paris X-Nanterre
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce the concept of conjectural variations across sectors called
"external conjectural variations" in a pure exchange economy. Three results are obtained.
First, the symmetric oligopoly equilibrium coincides with the Cournot equilibrium when the
conjectural variations are zero. Second, the symmetric oligopoly equilibrium coincides with
the competitive equilibrium when the conjectural variations take the value of the competitive
market equilibrium price. Third, the optimal strategies of agents between sectors are
complements (substitutes) when the conjectural variation is negative (positive).
This note is a second piece of a more general research devoted to the micro-foundations of cooperation failures and coordination
failures.
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In imperfectly competitive economies each agent when making a decision 
generally does note the effect of her/his action on the market (Bowley (1924)). 
The conjectural approach takes into account the perceptions by individuals of 
their market environment and intends to study price formation without an 
auctioneer by attempting a general equilibrium analysis of imperfect competition 
(Gale (1978), Hahn (1977)). These conjectures indicate the way any producer in a 
given sector thinks the other producers supply choice will vary when s/he 
modifies her/his own supply choice
1. The role played by (consistent) conjectures 
has been mainly developed in the context of production economies under partial 
equilibrium analysis (Bresnahan (1981), Figuières et alii (2004) or Perry (1982)).  
 
It is possible to bring conjectural variations in oligopoly equilibrium for pure 
exchange economies (Julien (2006)). We thus consider the framework of strategic 
multilateral exchange initially developed by Codognato-Gabszewicz (1991), 
(1993), and more recently pursued by Gabszewicz and Michel (1997) and 
Gabszewicz (2002)
2. The introduction of conjectural variations enables to study 
the effects of conjectures on prices and indirect utility at the symmetric oligopoly 
equilibrium (Julien (2006)). The price and the utility level generally increase with 
the value of the conjectural variations for agents who form it, but decrease with 
the conjecture formed by others. Moreover, the conjectural variations mimic the 
results which would be obtained in an environment where the oligopoly equilibria 
coincide with the competitive equilibrium
3.  
 
In this note, we propose to introduce the concept of external  conjectural 
variations which differs from the usual concept of (internal) conjectural variations. 
Both concepts capture the perceptions by individuals of their market environment, 
but they do not involve the same side of the market. The conjectural variations 
usually refer to the way any given agent expects the other agents who supply the 
same good will react to a change in her/his own strategy, whereas the external one 
refers to the way any given agent expects all the other agents who supply another 
good will react to a change in her/his own strategy. The latter concept is perhaps 
more appropriate in a general equilibrium framework than the former, which 
mainly emphasizes strategic interactions within a sector. In order to simplify, we 
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i x x / . Certain values 
are of particular interest (Perry (1982)). When  1 − = γ , each producer acts as a price taker and the 
equilibrium is competitive: each firm expects the other firms in their sector to absorb exactly its 
supply expansion by a corresponding supply reduction. When  0 = γ , each firm ignores the 
consequence of its action on the others’ actions: this is the Cournot equilibrium. Finally, when 
1 − = n γ , the equilibrium is collusive: firms behave so as to maximize joint profit. 
2 These authors study the relationship between market power and the number of agents. Different 
concepts of oligopoly equilibria can be developed depending on the way strategic behavior is 
introduced. 
3 In large economies, the competitive equilibrium can be obtained by an asymptotic identification 
or through a replication procedure.  
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only focus on conjectural variations across sectors
4. In particular, we show that 
the symmetric oligopoly equilibrium coincides with the symmetric Cournot 
equilibrium for a zero value of the conjectural variations. Moreover, we determine 
the conditions under which the symmetric oligopoly equilibrium coincides with 
the competitive equilibrium. Finally, we characterize the effect on any optimal 
strategy in one sector of a change in the optimal strategy of any agent located in 
the other sector. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the basic economy is described 
and the concept of conjectural variation across sectors is introduced. In section 3, 
we study the relation between the values taken by conjectures and the type of 
equilibrium, and then present the several results obtained. 
 
 
2. The basic economy 
 
Consider a pure exchange economy with two consumption goods (1 and 2) and 
m+n consumers. Preferences are represented by the following utility function: 
α α − =
1
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It is assumed that good 2 is taken as the numéraire, so  p  is the price of good 1 
as expressed in units of good 2.  
We consider that each agent behaves strategically. Each agent i manipulates the 
price by contracting her/his supply, i.e. the quantity of good 1 or 2 s/he offers. We 
denote  1 i s  the pure strategy of agents  m i ,..., 2 , 1 = , with  [ ] m si / 1 , 0 1 ∈ , and  2 i s  the 
pure strategy of agents  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 , with  [ ] n si / 1 , 0 1 ∈ .  
Finally, let us assume the agents who have an endowment in good 1 form a 
conjectural variation about the combined strategic supplies response of all other 
consumers who have an endowment of good 2 to a unit of change in their own 
strategic supply. This effect characterize some external conjectural variations, 
which is denoted  1 ν :  
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Equivalently, we define the conjectural variations for consumers who initially 
own quantities of good 2: 
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We assume  1 ν  and  2 ν  to be the same for each consumer and independent of 
both the supply of the other agents and the number of other agents. We moreover 
                                                 
4 In a recent research, we develop a model which gathers both concepts.    3
consider that the conjectures are consistent
5. These conjectures indicate the way 
that each consumer thinks the other consumers supply choice will vary after s/he 
varies her/his own supply choice. They are not exactly similar to those formed 
within each sector because they involve strategic interactions across sectors. 
Nevertheless, we verify through a simple example that most of the results we 
obtained with the usual concept of conjectural variations in pure exchange 
economies under general oligopoly equilibrium hold with this concept. In 
particular, it can be shown that for a certain value of the conjectural variations, the 
symmetric oligopoly equilibrium coincides with the Cournot equilibrium.  
 
 
3. Symmetric oligopoly equilibrium and conjectural variations 
 
A symmetric oligopoly equilibrium is defined as a  ) ( n m+ -tuple of strategies 
) ~ ,..., ~ , ~ ,..., ~ ( 2 12 1 11 n m m m s s s s + + , with  [ ] m si / 1 , 0 ~
1 ∈  for  m i ,..., 2 , 1 =  and  [] n si / 1 , 0 ~
2 ∈  for 
n m m i + + = ,..., 1 , and an allocation 
) ( 2
1 1 ) ~ ,..., ~ , ~ ,..., , ~ (
n m
n m m m IR x x x x
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+ + + ∈  such that 
(i) ) ~ , ~ ( ~
1 i i i i s s x x − =  and  () ( ) ) ~ , ( ) ~ , ~ ( 1 1 i i i i i i i i s s x U s s x U − − ≥  for  m i ,..., 2 , 1 =  and  (ii) 
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2 i i i i s s x x − =  and  () ( ) ) ~ , ( ) ~ , ~ ( 2 2 i i i i i i i i s s x U s s x U − − ≥  for n m m i + + = ,..., 1.  W e  
here assume that the symmetric oligopoly equilibrium exists and is unique. 
 



















+ = . Consequently, the non-cooperative equilibrium is associated 
with the resolution of the simultaneous strategic programs: 
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The  (m+n) conditions of optimality  0 / 1 = ∂ ∂ i i s U  for  m i ,..., 2 , 1 =  and 
0 / 2 = ∂ ∂ i i s U  for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 , yield the two types of reaction functions: 
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5 See Bresnahan (1981).   4
Result 1. When  0 2 1 = =ν ν , the symmetric oligopoly equilibrium coincides 
with to the symmetric Cournot equilibrium. 
 
Proof. We compute the symmetric oligopoly equilibrium for  0 2 1 = =ν ν  and 
compare it with the results obtained for the symmetric Cournot equilibrium. 
When  0 1 = ν  and  0 2 = ν , and with  ij ij s s − = ~ ~  2 , 1 = ∀j , (7) and (8) become 
respectively 0 ~ ) 1 )( 1 ( ~ ~ )] 1 ( [ 2 1 2 = − − − − − i i i s n m s s mn m α α  for  m i ,..., 2 , 1 =  and 
0 ~ ) 1 ( ~ ~ ) ( 1 2 1 = − − − i i i s m n s s mn n α α  for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . This yields 
{} )] 1 ( [ / ) 1 )( 1 ( ~
1 α α − − − − = m m m si  and  ) ( / ) 1 ( ~
1 α α − − = n n n si . Moreover, the 
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Ui  for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1.   
Consider now the programs given by (5) and (6). We can easily verify that the 
(m+n) conditions of optimality  0 / 1 = ∂ ∂ i i s U  for  m i ,..., 2 , 1 = , and  0 / 2 = ∂ ∂ i i s U  
for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 , lead to the preceding expressions for the optimal strategies 
prices, allocations and utility levels. This completes the proof. 
 
Result 2. If  γ = 1 v  (resp.  ε = 2 v ) and  n si / ~
2 α =  (resp.  n si / ) 1 ( ~
1 α − = ), then 
) 1 /( α α γ − =  (resp.  ) 1 /( α α ε − = ): the symmetric oligopoly equilibrium 
coincides with the competitive equilibrium.  
 
Proof. We first determine the competitive allocation. Second, we compute the 
symmetric oligopoly equilibrium for  γ = 1 v  and  ε = 2 v  and we compare it with 
the results found previously.  
When the behavior of each agent is competitive, the individual plans come 
from a non-strategic maximization of the utility subject to the budget constraint. 
The competitive equilibrium price, the competitive supply of each good and the 
associated allocation for each type of agents are respectively:  ) 1 /( α α − =
∗ p , 
m si / ) 1 ( 1 α − =
∗  and  ) / , / ( ) , ( 2 1 m m x x i i α α =
∗ ∗  for  m i ,..., 2 , 1 =  and  n si /
2 α =
∗  and 
() n n x x i i / ) 1 ( , / ) 1 ( ) , ( 2 1 α α − − =
∗ ∗  for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1 . The utility levels are 
m Ui / α =
∗  for  m i ,..., 2 , 1 =  and  n Ui / ) 1 ( α − =
∗  for  n m m i + + = ,..., 1.   
We now consider  γ = 1 v and  n sh / ~
2 α = . Substituting these values in (7) gives 
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 2 3 = − − − − − γ α α α γ α . This leads to  ) 1 /( α α γ − = . Symmetrically,   5
consider  ε = 2 v  and  n sh / ) 1 ( ~
1 α − = . Substituting these values in (8) gives 
) 1 /( α α ε − = . Thus 
∗ = = p ε γ .  This completes the proof. 
 
We remark that the value taken by the external conjectural variations that 
sustains the competitive equilibrium is not  1 2 1 − = = v v .  
 
Result 3. When  0 1 > v  ( 0 1 < v ), we have  0 / 2 1 < ∂ ∂ i i s s ( 0 / 2 1 > ∂ ∂ i i s s) .  
Equivalently, when  0 2 > v  ( 0 2 < v ), we have  0 / 1 2 < ∂ ∂ i i s s ( 0 / 1 2 > ∂ ∂ i i s s) .  
 
Proof. In order to simplify, consider the case where  2 / 1 = α  and  2 = = n m . 
These two restrictions imply  [ ] 2 / 1 , 0 ~
2 ∈ i s  and  [ ] 2 , 1 1 − ∈ ν . Under these conditions 
(7) becomes  []0 6 2 2 1 2 1
2
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 when  0 1 < v . Suppose 
now  0 1 > v . If, for instance,  0 ~
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 for  2 1 = v  respectively. 
The argument is similar for (8). This completes the proof. 
 
We remark that the optimal supplies are strategic complements for negative 
values of the conjectural variations and strategic substitutes for positive values. 




4. Concluding remarks 
 
The role of conjectural variations can be transposed across various sectors in 
general oligopoly equilibrium for pure exchange economies. As it stands for 
conjectural variations in a given sector, the oligopoly equilibrium can be viewed 
as a case where the conjectural variation across sector takes a zero value. 
Moreover, the existence of strategic complementarities may be captured by the 
external conjectural variations. 
The preceding model should be developed more deeply in order to take into 
account the two types of conjectural variations. 
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